Notice · This programme is currently under review. Dates, format and the final teaching team are not yet confirmed. The page below describes the programme as currently planned. For the latest position, please contact the Programme Director.
The binding constraint on better AI decisions is rarely the technical team's capacity. It is the senior leadership's ability to evaluate what the technical team brings forward. The course is built for the latter.
By the end of the programme, senior leaders can put precise questions directly to vendors and internal AI teams. These include:
Most AI courses for senior leaders fall into two camps: short workshops on prompting and tool use, or technical programmes that assume a quantitative background. Neither matches what most boards actually need.
This course sits in the gap between them. It treats senior decision-making, not the technology itself, as the binding constraint. The objective is to give the leader the discipline to read AI claims critically, the framework to decide what to invest in, and a way to design how humans stay in charge when an AI is acting on its own.
The workshops are where the delegate develops their organisation's position on AI. They leave with four short documents that capture it:
Each day follows the same pattern:
Senior leaders and analysts with strategic responsibility for AI investment, governance, or deployment. Board members, C-suite, directors on AI / technology / audit committees, and senior managers being groomed for board-level roles.
Three-day residential at Møller Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. University of Cambridge accreditation. Two nights' accommodation, college dinner, cohort of 25–30. No technical prerequisite. Planned for late September / early October 2026. Programme currently under review; dates and format not yet confirmed.
The binding constraint plays out differently across firm types. How the course applies, by firm type:
Day 1 opens with three questions a senior leader should be able to answer about AI: what are the different kinds on offer? What does each cost to deploy at scale? What value can each be expected to deliver?
The aggregate forecasts disagree sharply. Goldman Sachs projects cumulative GDP gains of 6.1% from AI over a decade; Acemoglu estimates 0.9%. Both are plausible readings of the same evidence. The gap is methodological — about whether AI augments or substitutes for human labour, and which cognitive tasks fall within its reach. Day 1 introduces the framework the course offers for working through that disagreement at the firm level.
The morning opens on Yann LeCun's (ex Chief AI Scientist at Meta) argument that intelligence, at its foundation, is the ability to learn. Each successive generation of AI learns differently — which means each one automates different things, and leaves different things to humans.
Each AI variant above reaches a different kind of work, distinguished in part by codifiability — the degree to which expertise can be written down as rules, procedures, or labelled examples.
The Three Tiers framework maps the three categories to a single question — one whose answer is shifting: does AI substitute for this work, complement it, or leave it untouched?
Three Tiers names where AI reaches. The economic frame names what it costs to put it there, and how those costs will move.
Two exercises:
Day 1 ends with the Tier Map complete — a working classification of where AI reaches the organisation and where it does not.
Day 2 takes the question many senior leaders are now facing: where are the AI productivity gains, and what does capturing them actually require?
The morning works through the empirical productivity evidence:
Two cost dynamics that condition how the productivity evidence translates into a real deployment:
By the end of Day 2, each participant has a completed Workflow Audit — one process decomposed, each step classified, and the productivity conditions identified.
Day 3 turns the analytical work of the first two days into decisions. It formalises the distinction between what AI can predict and what the leader must judge.
The economic foundation for the prediction–judgement distinction comes from Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb. AI lowers the cost of prediction; human judgement determines the payoffs that prediction is fed into. Their central result: prediction and judgement are complements over hidden costs. As prediction improves, the value of human judgement about downside risk rises, not falls.
Trust in AI is built specifically, not generally. The Johns Hopkins cancer-detection system — a narrow model on a single dataset, focused on a defined task with accountability when it fails — earns trust because of its specificity. An AI agent that can be prompted to do anything earns no trust because it has no edges. The worksheet exists to force the leader to make the trust question specific to the decision in front of them.
AI systems produce recommendations and confidence scores but do not record the reasoning that should accompany a consequential decision — nor the conditions under which the recommendation should be overridden.
Before acting on a significant AI recommendation, the leader completes a short worksheet that records two things:
It is not a check on the AI; it is a check on the leader's own reasoning — made necessary precisely because the AI's output can feel more certain than it is.
Two strategies have emerged for human-AI collaboration. The first maintains a clear division of labour: the human identifies which tasks fall inside the AI frontier and delegates only those. The second integrates human and machine at every step, with each AI output reviewed before the next iteration begins.
The first economises on human attention; the second provides continuous oversight at higher cognitive cost.
The afternoon returns to the workflow audited on Day 2 and specifies which strategy applies where. Across the literature, the human role at the points where AI does not act alone is converging on a four-step cycle: Define what the AI is supposed to do; Configure it to do that well; Measure whether it is doing it; Refine when it is not. The Human-Decision Map specifies, for each step in the audited workflow, who owns each part of that cycle.
Day 3 closes with two completed templates: the Human-Decision Map, specifying where human judgement is required and what it must do; and the Strategic Memo — one page setting out what the firm will do with AI, what it will not do, and why.
Each workshop produces one working document, built from the participant's own organisation. The four templates — Tier Map, Workflow Audit, Human-Decision Map, and Strategic Memo — form a connected sequence: each feeds the next, and together they constitute a board position on AI grounded in the firm's own analysis rather than a consultant's generic framework.
A one-page sort of the firm's distinctive expertise into three tiers — codifiable, partially codifiable, residual. Built in the Day 1 afternoon workshop. Identifies where AI compression matters most.
One workflow drawn from the Tier Map, decomposed into steps. Each step classified by AI's role: substitute, compress, or augment. Identifies the one or two steps where the AI case stands or falls — and the data requirements that determine whether deployment is feasible at all.
For each step in the audited workflow, who makes the call — the AI or the human. At the human steps, what the human is specifically responsible for across the Define / Configure / Measure / Refine cycle. Includes a clear, testable rule for when the human's involvement is real and when it is just rubber-stamping.
The one-page board paper drawn from the previous three templates: what the firm will do on AI, what it will not do, and why — grounded in the firm's own knowledge map, workflow audit and human-decision map rather than a consultant's generic recommendation.
Participants work through a complete worked example before applying the method to their own firm. The primary example is built for a UK Distribution Network Operator operating under Ofgem's RIIO framework — a regulated monopoly in which AI's role in cost efficiency and service quality is under regulatory scrutiny. Additional examples across commercial and professional-services contexts are in development.
The programme is taught by Cambridge Faculty of Economics, supported by senior industry advisors actively building AI in industry today.
Dr. Melvyn Weeks
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge economist with expertise across machine learning, causal ML, generative AI, and agentic AI. Teaches the Cambridge MPhil course in Causal Inference and Machine Learning.
The programme draws on senior practitioners from frontier AI development — including a knowledge engineering lead from Amazon, an applied scientist working on LLMs and generative AI at Amazon, and a former research lead from Microsoft Research who built natural-language Excel formulas inside the Copilot programme. A senior practitioner from JPMorgan supports the financial-services applications.
Cambridge Faculty teaching, supported by industry professionals from JPMorgan, Amazon, and ex-Microsoft Research — building agentic AI and large language models in industry today.
Pricing for open-enrolment delegates and bespoke single-company variants is available on request.
Three-day residential at Møller Centre, Churchill College. Cohort of 25–30 senior leaders from deliberately mixed sectors. Two open-enrolment cohorts planned per year.
Many buyers send 2–3 delegates from the same organisation. Group rates available on request.
Same intellectual architecture, customised to a single client's vendor stack, sector and board agenda. Delivered at Møller or in-house.
For pricing, dates, or to register interest, please contact the Programme Director, Dr. Melvyn Weeks (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge) — mw217@econ.cam.ac.uk.
The programme is currently in development. Certification through the Møller Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge is under consideration.